Boats and Docks
4. Overall Analysis
What Rule is the most efficient?
1. With all the assumptions in place, all the rules are equally efficient.
2. With high contracting costs, the liability rules are more efficient than the property rules.
3. With imperfect information and high contracting costs, the two sided liability rule is the most efficient.
What are the distributive consequences of each rule?
1. Under the property rules, whoever is enjoined is given the weaker bargaining position.
1. All Assumptions in place
General Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500 (Enjoined)
Yes, with a contract
-700, 200
No
-900, 0
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes, with Contract
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docked with Contract
-700, 200
Efficiency Outcome
Docked with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500 (Enjoined)
No
-100, 0
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: No
Boat owner: Either way
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking
-100, 0
Efficiency Outcome
No Docking
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Neccesity Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
-500, 0
No
0, -900
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docked
-500, 0
Efficiency Outcome
Docked with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
-500, 0
No
0, -100
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: No
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking
-100, 0
Efficiency Outcome
No Docking
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Reverse General Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No
-900, 0 (Enjoined)
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docked
0,-500
Efficiency Outcome
Docked
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No, with contract
200, -300
No
-100, 0 (Enjoined)
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: No with contract
Boat owner: No with contract
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking with contract
200,-300
Efficiency Outcome
No docking, with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
3. Imperfect information
Neccesity Rule
Game
Expensive Boat
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
-500, 0
No
0, -900
No
-900, 0
Cheap Boat
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
-500, 0
No
0, -100
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Depends on value of the boat
Equilibrium Outcome
Expensive boat
Docked
-500, 0
Cheap boat
Not Docked
-100, 0
Efficiency Outcome
Expensive boat
Docked
Cheap boat
Not Docked
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
One Sided Liability Rule
Game
Expensive Boat
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No
0, -900
No
-900, 0
Cheap Boat
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No
0, -100
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Either way
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Expensive boat
Either way
(0, -500) or (0, -900)
Cheap boat
Either way
(0, -500) or (0, -100)
Efficiency Outcome
Expensive boat
Either way
Cheap boat
Either way
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Not always
2. High Contracting Costs
One Sided Liability Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0,-500
No
0, -900
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docked
0, -500
Efficiency Outcome
Docked with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No
0, -100
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: No
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking
-100, 0
Efficiency Outcome
No Docking
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
General Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500 (Enjoined)
Yes, with a contract
-700, 200
No
-900, 0
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: No
Boat owner: Either way
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking
-900, 0
Efficiency Outcome
Docked with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
No
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500 (Enjoined)
No
-100, 0
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: No
Boat owner: Either way
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking
-100, 0
Yes
Efficiency Outcome
No Docking
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Neccesity Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
-500, 0
No
0, -900
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docked
-500, 0
Efficiency Outcome
Docked with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
-500, 0
No
0, -100
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: No
Equilibrium Outcome
No Docking
-100, 0
Efficiency Outcome
No Docking
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Reverse General Rule
Expensive Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No
-900, 0 (Enjoined)
No
-900, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docked
0,-500
Efficiency Outcome
Docked
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
Yes
Cheap Boat
Game
Boat owner: Do I dock?
Yes
Dock owner: Do I allow the boat owner to dock?
Yes
0, -500
No, with contract
200, -300
No
-100, 0 (Enjoined)
No
-100, 0
Analysis
Explanation of Pay-off Nodes
Backwards Deduction
Dock owner: Yes
Boat owner: Yes
Equilibrium Outcome
Docking
0, -500
Efficiency Outcome
No docking, with or without contract
Is the Equilibrium outcome efficient?
No
